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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
FRANK D. WATKINS and VENIA
WATKINS,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

Case No.

9131

GLEN M. SIMONDS and BEVERLY
J. SIMONDS,
Defendants and Respondents.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEME.NT OF FACTS
This is an action to quiet title in an Easement by Way
of Necessity of an irrigation ditch, or in the alternative, as
being within the express grant of a utility easement, said
ditch running over the defendants' property and connecting
to the plaintiffs' property, both of which are located in
Block 2, Holladay I-I eights Plat "A" Subdivision, located
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
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Plaintiffs also asked for damages and injunctive relief
for the purpose of re-opening said ditch closed by defen•
dants.
A Temporary Restraining Order was issued by the
court on June 12, 1958 and made permanent for the duration of the action on September 10, 1958.
Defendants filed an Answer September 17, 1958.
On March 5, 1959 defendants made a motion for Summary Judgment. On April 2, 1959 plaintiffs filed an
Amended Complaint. On April 7, 1959 defendants filed an
Answer to the Amended Complaint. On July 27, 1959 plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Motions for Summary Judgment were heard before the court on July 16, 1959 and were taken under ad•
visement and leave given the plaintiffs to submit a Memorandum of Authorities by July 20, 1959 and for defendants' answering Memorandum by July 23, 1959. On July
31, 1959, the court signed an Order filed July 31, 1959,
granting Summary Judgment to the defendants.
On August 10, 1959 a Second Amended Complaint was
filed and on August 11, 1959, plaintiffs made a Motion to
Set Aside the Summary Judgment, To Amend and To Maintain the· Status Quo. On August 24, 1959 plaintiffs made
a Motion for a new trial, to alter the Summary Judgment
and for leave to amend the Complaint. On August 11, 1959
the court reinstated the Restraining Order previously effective during the pendency of the action.
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Upon stipulation of parties the court entertained argument on plaintiffs' Motions without notice on August 28,
1959, at which time a new Second Amended Complaint was
proffered by plaintiffs, and upon stipulation of parties the
court ordered that it reiate back to August 10, 1959 when
the original Second Amended Complaint was filed and considered in lieu of the said original Second Amended Complaint for all purposes herein. Considering this new Second
Amended Complaint in connection with the argument of
counsel on the 28th day of August, 1959, the court denied
plaintiffs' Motions to amend, to alter the Summary Judgment and for a new trial.
On August 29, 1959, plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal.
Had this matter been permitted to go to trial on its
merits plaintiffs maintain that the pleadings show and the
evidence would have revealed the following facts:
That the property which later came to be known as
Block 2 of Holladay H·eights Plat "A" Subdivision was irrigated farm land and that a ditch which ran in a north-south
direction through the middle of said Block had existed for
some period of time in excess of 30 years, which ditch was
used to carry irrigation water through the Block from
which laterals extended irrigating the tract. That said
property was owned and the ditch so used by Mr. Wilford
Seequist until 1947, at which time the property was subdivided and an official plat of said subdivision was filed in the
office of the Salt Lake County Recorder in July of that
year.
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That Alliance Realty and Building Company, who participated in the subdivision, acquired the lots. in Block 2,
specifically Lots 6 and 3, through a Contract of Purchase
some time prior to November 1, 1948. That plaintiffs obtained title to Lot 6, Block 2, October, 1954, and defendants
obtained Lot 3, Block 2, January, 1955.
Upon subdivision the above noted ditch ran through the
rear of what came to he known as Lots 3 and 6 of the said
Block 2. During the course of construction of homes on
the lots in the said Block 2, debris and foreign matter were
deposited in the said ditch. Some time around July 1, 1~52,
the said ditch was cleared out at the direction of Alliance
Realty and Building Company and Wendell A. Livingston,
who were two of the subdividers.
That during the period 1948 through 1959 the direction of flow of water through the said ditch changed three
times (See Map R. 50), but only the one ditch over the rear
of Lot 3 was used and the use was continuous.
The ditch in question was apparent, obvious and visible
to the defendants and their mesne grantor who took from
Alliance Realty and Building Company, and to plaintiffs
and their mesne grantor, who took from Alliance Realty
and Building Company.
Evidence would have shown that the use of the ditch
was reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of plaintiffs'
estate on Lot 6, and that no other practical means of conveying plaintiffs' water to their property is available.
There would be additional evidence showing that at
the time of subdividing a "utility easement" was created
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across the rear five feet of the lots in Block 2 and that said
ditch was within the five-foot easement, and it was the
intention of the subdividers to consider the ditch a utility.
Additional facts (admitted in the defendants' Answers)
would have been that the defendants filled in the said ditch
at the rear of Lot 3 and fenced off the same.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO THE DEFENDANTS.
POINT II.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT PLAINTIFFS TO AMEND
THEIR COMPLAINT FOLLOWING THE SUMMARY JUDGME.NT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A SUMlVIARY JUDGMENT TO THE DEFENDANTS.
(a) Defendants apparently were granted Summary
Judgment in this matter as a result of inconsistencies between the plaintiffs' pleadings and their Memorandum of
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Authorities. However, it is plaintiffs' contention that,
viewed as a whole, in spite of the inconsistencies, the record
states a cause of action on which relief could be granted,
and accordingly, a trial of the matter on its merits should
have been permitted.
The inconsistencies are as follows: First, paragraph
4 (a) of the Amended Complaint (R. 13 and 14) states the
ditch in question was "constructed" in 1952; second, that
plaintiffs' Memorandum (R. 41) shows a unity of title in
Wilford Seequist, and the chains of title listed make it
appear that Alliance Realty and Building Company had
divested itself of Lot 6 prior to its acquisition of Lot 3 before the ditch was "constructed". In addition, the statements in the Memorandum referring to the map attached
to plaintiffs' lVIemorandum and the map itself (R. 41 and
50) might give the implication that three ditches were in
use during the period of time in question.
Defendants, in their Memorandum, ignored paragraphs
2 (b) and 11 of the Amended CompJaint (R. 12, 13 and 16)
which alleged the existence and use of the ditch for a period of more than 21 years. Further, these facts are referred
to specifically in plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum, point three
( R. 55) . Also ignored were the allegations of paragraph
5 (a) of the Amended Complaint (R. 14) which allege that
Alliance Realty and Building Company was the common
grantor of both the plaintiffs and defendants.
While it is unfortunate that the Amended Complaint,
with reference to the clearing of the ditch in 1952, uses the
word "constructed", it wouLd seem apparent in read-
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ing the entire Amended Complaint, that the purpose of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, and the map (R. 12, 13, 14 and 50) was
designed to show the change in direction and flow of the
water in the same ditch over the time period in question.
Defendants further maintained that, based upon the
allegations in plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and Memorandum, the water flowed in a northward direction rather
than a southward direction for a period of time, thus making Lot 3 dominant and Lot 6 a s·ervient estate, and thereby
extinguishing any possible right of necessity. It is the
plaintiffs' position that direction of flow of the water is
not determinative of which estate is dominant or servient.
A recent and leading case on the subj.ect which com-

piles much of the Utah and foreign law on ways of necessity
is Adamson vs. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P. 2d 264. The
case rules that the burdens and rights unde·r ways of necessity are reciprocal and once established cannot be interfered
with by the o-vvners of either the servient or dominant estate, and quotes with approval the case of Phillips· vs. Phillips, 48 Penn. 178, 86 Am. Dec. 577 in the following language:
"Servitudes, adopted by the owner of land,
which are plainly visible or notorious, and from the
character of which it may fairly be presumed that
he intended their preservation as necessary to the
convenient enjoyment of his property, become, when
the lands are divided and pass into other hands permanent appurtenances thereto, and the owner of
neither the dominant nor s·ervient portions of the
land has power adversely to interfere with their
proper use and enjoyment."
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The Adamson case further spells out in summary the
elements needed to establish an easement by right of nece-ssity in the following language:
"The elements essential to constitute an easement by severance a.re: ( 1) Unity of title followed
by severance; (2) That at the tim.e of the severance
the servitude was apparent, obvious, and visible;
(3) That the easement is reasonably necessary to
the enjoyment of the dominant estate; and. (4) It
must usually be continuous and self-acting, as distinguished from one used only from time to time
when occasion arises."
By that standard, (plaintiffs' Memorandum, notwithstanding) the Amended Complaint, does in fact state a cause
of action, to-wit: (1) Unity of title is alleged in paragraph
5 (a) of the Complaint (R. 14). (2) Existence of the ditch
at the time of the severance is alleged in paragraphs 2 (b)
and 4 (a) (R. 12, 13 and 14) ; and that it was visible and
apparent is alleged in paragraphs 5 (b) (R. 14). (3) That
the easement is "reasonably necessary" is alleged in paragraph 8 (R. 15). (4) That there has been continuous and
self-acting use is alleged in paragraph 2 (b) (R. 12 and 13).
At the time of argument, with regard to the unity of

title discrepancy, counsel for plaintiffs relied on the case
of Hubbard vs Littlefield, 128 A. 285, 38 A. L. R. 1306,
wherein is found the language:
"If, * * * this unity of ownership is shown
to have existed, its remoteness here in point of time,
or by reason of intervening conveyances, is immaterial."
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Similar holdings were also cited in the cases of Taylor
vs. Warnaky, 59 Cal. 350, and Logan vs. Stagsdale, 123 Ind.
372, 24 N. E. 235, 8 L. R. A. 58. In the argument, counsel
for plaintiffs conceded that the word "constructed" in the
Amended Complaint would better have been "cleared out"
or "cleaned of debris", but that the ditch running across
the rear of Lot 3 had been in continuous existence and
use for some 35 or more years past, prior to the defendants'
act in closing said ditch.
Also, at the time of argument, counsel for plaintiffs
argued that defendants' objection concerning the direction
of flow of water was untena:ble. While it was admitted by
plaintiffs that during the ten-year period immediately prior
to the litigation, water had entered the ditch in question
at three different points. and flowed either north to south
or south to north, or for a period beginning at Lot 3 and
flowing in both northerly and southerly directions, this
was not in and of itself a negation of the existence of the
ditch and of the way of necessity over it for the benefit of
contiguous lots. Counsel cited the Adamson case noted
above with its citation from Phillips vs. Phillips, also noted
above.
With regard to each of these elements, counsel for
plaintiffs advised the court that it was aware that such
matters would have to be substantiated with evidence and
that they were prepared to produce such evidence to prove
the truth of the allegations. The issue at that time before the
court, however, was sufficiency of the allegations themselves, not the proof thereof.
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Since the T'rial Court granted the Summary Judgment,
it must be concluded that the court felt that the allegations
in the Amended ·Complaint were insufficient to state a cause
of action. Counsel for plaintiffs-appellants here maintain
that such holding was error.
(b) In granting defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, the District Court apparently ruled that the
ditch in question, as a matter of liaw, was not a utility sufficient to come within the express utility easement dedicated and recorded by the subdividers. The question as to
whether or not the said ditch was a utility and whether or
not the subdividers intended it so to be considered, plaintiffs maintain it is not solely a question of law but one of
fact and is a valid cause of action, and was so pleaded by the
plaintiffs in their Amended Complaint, paragraph 9 (b) (R.
15 and 16).
POINT II.
THE DISTRICT . COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT PLAINTIFFS TO AMEND
THEIR COMPLAINT FOLLOWING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

When counsel for the plaintiffs learned of the court's
intention to uphold the defendants' selective view of the
facts alleged, plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint (R. 34-39) on August lOth; and on August 11th filed
their Motion to S.et Aside the Summary Judgment, To
Amend, and To Maintain the Status Quo. The Motions and
Second Amended Complaint were considered by the court
on August 28th and denied apparently on the ground they
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came too late. Counsel for plaintiffs maintain that this is
contrary to the liberal construction this court has given
to the provisions of Rule 15 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, relating to amendment of pleadings.
Counsel for plaintiffs call the court's attention to the
fact that a copy of the Summary Judgment signed by the
District Judge was served upon the plaintiffs by mailing
a copy of it on the day prior to its being signed and filed
(R. 26), which makes such copy no more than an unsigned
proposed judgment and which raises the question as to
whether it constitutes notice of the judgment at all. In any
event, such notice by mail under the terms of Rule 6 (e)
extends the time within which opposing motions must be
filed for three days ; hence, the filing of the Motion to Set
Aside the Summary Judgment and To Amend on August
11th was seasonably filed, and the District Court erred in
denying those motions.
Counsel further urge that this Court take notice of
the fact that the custom of the courts in this jurisdiction
is to specify a time within which to amend in the Summary
Judgment itself, or to reinstate the action upon the seasonable filing of an Amended Complaint. In this case the
Second Amended Complaint was filed on the lOth day (August 10, 1959) after entry of the judgment.
Certainly, in view of the fact that the offered pleading
was filed as of August 10, 1959, it would be in the furtherance of justice to allow the same to be considered by the
Court and a trial granted thereon. This is in keeping with
the statement of this Court in Bonneville Lumber Company

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12

vs. J. G. Peppard Seed Company, 72 U. 463, at page 471,
271 Pac. 226, at page 229 :

"Amendments to pleadings, when seasonably
proposed, are generally allowed with great liberality.
When not seasonably proposed, it should be made to
appear that they are at least offered in furtherance
of justice."
In the case of Hancock vs. Luke, 46 Utah 26, at page
37, 148 P. 452, the court permitted an amendment to an
Answer even after judgment on the pleadings had been
granted, in the following language:
"In case pleadings are assailed, must a party
move to amend before he is apprised of what the ruling of the court will be? We think not. We are of
the opinion, therefore, that the motion for leave to
amend was time1y. We are also of the opinion that,
under the circumstances, it constituted reversible
error for the court to deny the motion for leave to
amend. It is quite clear that it was the intention of
the attorney who drew the answer to deny the allegations of the complaint respecting fraud and the misrepresentations as well as some of the other allegations. It is equally apparent that, in the opinion of
the· District Court, he had failed to do that. It is
also clear that, in pleading the affirmative matters
contained in the answer, the pleader left many of
them in doubt by failing to make clear and concise
statements. All those statements, as well as the denials, were amendable, however, and, if properly
amended, might set forth a defense to the cause of
action, to some extent at least, either negative or
affirmative. Wha~t we mean is that it cannot be said
in advance that the answer could not be so amended,
as to set forth at least a partial defense to the matters set forth in the complaint. If, in this case,
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plaintiff had interposed a general demurrer to the
answer, and the court had sustained it, the defendants would have been permitted to amend their
answer as a matter of course under the practice, if
not as a matter of absolute right. This is the view
that is taken by the author of Pomeroy's Code Remedies (4th Ed.), Section 454. * * * Is there
any reason for a different rule in case of a motion
for judgment on the pleadings? We confess our inability to discover any substantial difference between a general demurrer and a motion for judgment on the pleadings, in so far as. the right to
amend is concerned."
Counsel for plaintiffs maintain that this case is clearly
in point. While the case was decided prior to the existence
of Rule 15 (a) it deals with the same subject matter, and
so far as counsel are able to determine, has never been overruled or distinguished by this court, and the notation of the
case itself still continues to appear in the annotations under
Rule 15 (a) in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Also relevant is the case of Peterson vs. Union Pacific
Railroad Company, 79 Utah 213, 8 P. 2d 627, whe-rein is
stated at page 221 the following:
"There is applicable to cases of this kind the
rule that a pleading should be liberally construed
with a view to substantial justice between the parties, Comp. Laws Utah 1917, Section 6596; Grover
vs. Cash, 69 Utah 194, 253 P. 676 ; note 8 A. L. R.
1406 ; especially where there is reasonable ground
for holding that the amendment is an amplification
of allegations already stated, Clinchfield R. Co. vs.
Dunn (C. C. A.) 40 F. 2d 586, 74 A. L. R. 1276, the
courts not being disposed to a technical or narrow
construction where the transaction alleged in the
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amendment is the same as in the original Complaint,
Texas & P. R. Co. vs. Cox, 145 U. S. 593, 12 S. Ct.
905, 36 L. Ed. 829."
Counsel for plaintiffs further wish to call the court's
attention to the case of Provo City, et al. vs. Claudin, et al.,
91 Utah 60, 63 P. 2d 570, wherein the Court said:
"It must be noted that the court may, upon sustaining a demurrer, refuse to permit an amendment
to a pleading if it deems no amendment can be made
which will circumvent the ruling. The implications
of Section 104-14-3 so speak. In such case, the
pleader is virtually out of court. It is as if the court
had said, 'Your pleading is not good in law and,
under the facts as I apprehend they can be pleaded,
you cannot state a good action or defense in law.'
Naturally, it is not usually done on a first Complaint
or Answer because the court cannot ordinarily know
that other facts to make the pleading good cannot
be pleaded. And a refusal to permit pleading O'Ver

where it do-es not appear positive that no cause of
action or defense can be pleaded may run easily into
an abuse of discretion." (Emphasis added.)
Under the doctrine of the Peterson case noted above, it
is to be observed that the Second Amended Complaint does
not state any new cause of action, but rather amplifies the
causes of action originally stated in the Amended Complaint,
and in particular, alleges at paragraph 3 (R. 34 and 35)
unity of title in the Alliance Realty and Building Company;
at paragraphs 4 and 5 (R. 35), that one ditch was in use
continuously for 50 years or more last past; at paragraph
6 (R. 35) that the ditch was plain, obvious and visible, and
defendants had know ledge of said ditch and took subject
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thereto; and in paragraph 7 (R. 35), reasonable necessity
is alleged.
Under the doctrine of the Provo City case above cited,
since the Second Amended Complaint does clearly state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, failure of the District Court in exercising its discretion to permit such
amendment amounts to an abuse of discretion.
Whether or not this court is disposed to view the
amended Complaint as a valid pleading, clearly the Second
Amended Complaint refused by the District Court eliminates the seeming discrepancies in plaintiffs' Memorandum
and Amended Complaint, and does in fact allege the necessary elements to state· a cause of action, and the refusal
of the District Court to permit the amendment was error.
CONC'LUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs-appellants respectfully request this court to reverse the Summary Judgment of the District Court and set it aside with instructions
to proceed with trial on the plaintiffs' Amended Complaint
or in the alternative with instructions to permit the filing
of the Second Amended Complaint with leave in the defendants to answer said Second Amended Complaint and proceed to trial thereon.
Respectfully submitted,
Gordon A. Madsen,
of ANDERSON, JARDINE
and MADSEN,

Attorneys for Appellants.
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